

Relations between the Nguyen Lords of Southern Vietnam and the Champa Kingdom: A Preliminary Study

by

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INTRODUCTION

Right up until the middle of the 15th Century, the Vietnamese sphere of influence in the south was still very much checked by the Champa Kingdom. The capital of the Champa was then at Vijaya, which *corresponds* with the present day Binh Dinh province. Then in 1471, Emperor Le Thanh Ton (1460-1497) of the newly established Le Dynasty (1428-1788) launched an attack that crushed Champa and forced the latter to shift its centre of power to Kauthara, near present day Nha Trang. Vietnamese sources considered the defeated Champa as one of Vietnam's tributary states and the King of Champa was obliged to send an annual tribute to the Vietnamese Court at Thanh Long (present day Hanoi). Thus Vietnam-Champa ties was governed by tribute-relationship. Following 1471 the boundary between the Vietnamese and Champa was fixed at Phu Yen, where a marker was laid to mark the delineation line. The place was called mount Thach-bi, or stone-marker. The boundaries stood for another 140 years until another major conflict between the Vietnamese and Champa broke out.

Between 1471 to 1527, Vietnam was effectively under the control of the Le Dynasty and Le Thanh Ton's successors ruled Vietnam that covers a territory that stretched from the Chinese borders in the north to Phu Yen in the south. Then in 1527, Mac Dang Dung, a grand mandarin in the Le Government seized the throne and proclaimed a new Mac Dynasty. The event threw the country into a state of civil war that lasted until 1592 when the Mac Dynasty was finally defeated by the Le-restoration movement. This was in turn followed by a split in the Le-restoration camp which broke the country into two different parts, each with their respective centres of power. In the north region of the Linh Giang river, the Trinh family was in control, while in the south the Nguyen family maintained their influence. Both, however, continued to pay allegiance to the Le Emperor.

As it was southern Vietnamese regions¹ that came into direct contact with the domains of the Champa Kingdom, it was the Nguyen Lords that the rulers of Champa had to deal with in the next hundred years. It was the Nguyen Lords who would eventually decide the fate of the Champa kingdom as it sought to strengthen its position *vis-a-vis* the Trinh in the north. It did this by absorbing the declining Champa kingdom.

NGUYEN-CHAMPA RELATIONS 1558-1728

The first mention of the Champa Kingdom in the *Dai Nam Thuc Luc Tien Bien* (hereafter *Tien Bien*), the official records of the Nguyen Lords period compiled by historians and scribed in the Quoc Su Quan (Historical Academy) of the later Nguyen Dynasty (1802-1945), was in 1611 when Po Nit, the ruler of Champa², launched an attack against the border close to the Vietnamese prefecture town of Phu Yen (phu³ Phu Yen). By then, the capital of Champa had been moved to Panduranga, near present day Phan Rang. Nguyen Hoang (1588-1613), the first Nguyen Lord ordered one of his commanders, Van Phong to defend the frontiers, and later, maintained a garrison in the area.⁴ No efforts however, was made to enter Champa territories. This was perhaps due to the fact that Nguyen Hoang probably felt that his domains was yet to be firmly secured against the Trinh in the north. Further more, Nguyen Hoang was already in advanced age. He died two years later at the age of 89.

The second incident took place in 1629 when Nguyen Phuc Nguyen (1613-1635),⁵ the second Nguyen Lord sent the former Mac general, Nguyen Phuc Vinh to pacify a rebellious Champa in 1629. After the success of the campaign, the garrison of dinh⁶ Tran Bien was set up.⁷ The setting up of the garrison marked the extension of the Vietnamese frontiers beyond Phu Yen for the first time since the days of Le Anh Ton. Champa was seen by the Nguyen Lords as much as a major threat in the south as that of the Mac

usurper in the north. The external policy of the Nguyens was in resisting Champa in the south, and defending against the Mac in the north.⁸

During the period of the first three Nguyen Lords (1558-1648),⁹ the southern Vietnamese became preoccupied with the affairs in the north - i.e., to help the Le Court against the Mac. Later, beginning with Nguyen Phuc Nguyen they began a series of battles against the Trinh, the *de facto* ruler in the Le court. This preoccupation with the north allowed the Nguyen to co-exist with Champa with dinh Tran Bien as the demarcation line. From 1629 to 1648, the year of Nguyen Phuc Lan's death, the Nguyen domains were hardly threatened by Champa, or at least there are no historical sources which suggests otherwise.

In 1648, Nguyen Phuc Lan (1635-1648), the third Nguyen Lord decided to resettle prisoners of war, captured in the battle against the Trinh in March that year. Instead of sending the prisoners off to some hinterland or even some deserted islands as suggested by some of his advisors, Nguyen Phuc Lan saw the possibility in utilising the former enemies to be pioneers in opening up the now "deserted Champa land south of Thanh Trinh (phu Than Binh & Trinh Phien)". The men were supplied with farming apparatus, and half a year's grain. In expectation that within a few years, the new regions would be producing enough for the granaries and to contribute to the taxes. It was also hoped that eventually (twenty years later) the move would supply conscripts for the army.¹⁰ Thus, began the first official resettlement programme under the Nguyen Lords in former Champa. Nonetheless, it is difficult to determine as to when unofficial form of settlements in former land of Champa by other Vietnamese who, due the armed conflicts and natural disasters, were uprooted from their places of origin. It is most likely that such mass-resettlements began immediately after a new piece of land was annexed by the Vietnamese from Champa, or at least, after the setting up of a Vietnamese government administration in such area.

At this juncture, it is worth investigating the strength of the much depleted Champa Kingdom which now held court at Panduranga, or present day Thuan Thanh. While it is widely accepted that Champa was declining since their defeat by Le Anh Ton, it is reasonable to expect that they still maintained a sizeable army that could challenge the authority of the Nguyen Lords, particularly during the early days of the Nguyen expansion in the south. In 1653, the Champa army under Ba Tam or Po Nraup¹¹ attacked Phu Yen. An army of 3,000 was send by Nguyen Phuc Tan (1648-87) under the leadership of Hung Loc to face the attacking army of Champa. The Champa army was defeated in a surprised counter-attack near to Phu Yen, and was forced to retreat across the Phan Rang River and sued for peace. A peace treaty was concluded under which, the Nguyen Lords annexed the whole area

east of the Phan Rang River and set up the two phu (prefectures) of Thai Khanh and Dien Ninh. Both came under the administration and protection of Dinh Thai Khanh (present day Ninh Hoa). Champa remained in control of the area west of the Phan Rang River, but the ruler of Champa was once again obliged to send tributes to the Vietnamese. This time, it was to the Nguyen Lords.¹²

It is interesting to note that Champa was still able and willing to engage the Vietnamese in battles and to resist the encroachments by the Vietnamese. King Po Nraup's action was based on the need to protect Champa interests from being violated by more Vietnamese resettlement programmes as well as the belief that Nguyen Phuc Tan was still new to the administration and that the Nguyen had just ended some military campaigns which may prove to be exhaustive for the Vietnamese army. Though he was proven wrong in this strategy, Po Nraup was still able to demonstrate that Champa was still a force to be reckoned with.

The Champa territories however, had been so reduced in size that some Vietnamese territories, including dinh Tran Bien and dinh Thai Khanh, were actually bordering the Chenla Kingdom (Khmer-Cambodia). The Nguyen came to have a common border with Chenla in 1653 with the defeat of Po Nraup. Five years later, in 1658, Chenla began to threaten the southern frontiers of the Nguyen Lords, forcing the Vietnamese to maintain three lines of defence: The main defence in the north was against the Trinh; the Southeast region was threatened by a still potent Champa, and the Southwest region by Chenla.

From 1653 until 1692, the Nguyen's preoccupation in the south had been Chenla (present day Cambodia). Their relationship with Chenla resulted in the splitting of the Chenla court into two, one supported by the Vietnamese and the other by the Siamese court at Ayudhya. In 1692, the Chams were once again felt confident enough to challenge the Vietnamese. In the eighth month of that year, Po Saut or Ba-tranh¹³, the King of Champa at Panduranga, (Pho Hai-Phan Rang-Phan Ri region) began building fortifications and often plundering Dien Khanh (phu Dien Ninh and dinh Binh Khang), "rebelled" against the Nguyen.¹⁴ A Vietnamese force under Nguyen Huu Kinh, consisting of the main garrison (Chinh dinh) and the garrison from Binh Khang in Quang Nam was sent to pacify the Chams. The sending of the main garrison was clearly an indication of the sign of the Nguyen Lords' ability to turn their attention towards the south from the usually heavy defence commitments in the north, and the ability to spare the forces from the main base for the campaign.

The campaign ended with a defeat for Champa in the first month of 1693. However, the Cham King, Po Saut and his followers were captured only seven months later. Po Saut was brought back to Phu Xuan, where he was interned at Ngoc-tran Son at huyen¹⁵ Tra-huong, and was well-provided for. During the absence of Po Saut the Champa Court at Pho Hai-Phan Rang-Phan Ri was renamed tran Thuan Thanh. It was garrisoned by three Nguyen forces led by Cai Doi (commander) Nguyen Tri Thang (Pho Hai), Cai Doi Nguyen Thanh Le (Phan Ri) and Cai Doi Chu Kiem Thang (Phan Rang) to prevent attacks from the remnants of the Champa forces.¹⁶ With the establishment of the garrisons, the Champa kingdom at Panduranga was formally annexed, and thus began a unique relationship between the Nguyen Lords and the Chams.

In the eight month of 1693, Nguyen Phuc Chau (1691-1725), the sixth Nguyen Lord decided to place new leaders to rule Champa. And to set aside the authority of Po Saut. Po Saktiraydaputih or Ke-ba-tu,¹⁷ who was Po Saut's lieutenant was sent back to tran Thuan Thanh, which was by now further renamed phu Binh Thuan. Po Saktiraydaputih was given the title of Kham-ly (a civil official), and his three sons were each given the military appointments of de-doc, de-lanh and cai-phu. Nguyen Phuc Chau also ordered the people of Champa to change their costumes to that of the Han (Chinese) tradition which was also the costumes of the Vietnamese.¹⁸ As a mark of granting of the autonomy, Nguyen Phuc Chau also returned to Po Saktiraydaputih, the royal seal of Champa together with captured weapons, horses and population. Thirty Vietnamese soldiers or Kinh Binh (soldiers of the Imperial City) were sent to protect the new Cham ruler.¹⁹ Thus began the process of Vietnamization of the Champa territories that was to continue over a long period.

In the twelfth month of that year, remnants of the Cham forces rallied to the call of Oc-nha That, a former official of Champa. Oc-nha That had teamed up with a Chinese named A-Ban, who was also called Ngo Lang. The latter was reputed to have the power of a shaman including the power of invulnerability. Thus he was able to attract the support of some quarters of the Champa population who resisted the new culture and political domination that were imposed by the Vietnamese. Initially, Oc-nha That's Champa forces caught the Nguyen garrisons at Phan Rang-Phan Ri by surprise, and Nguyen Tri Thang, the commander for Pho Hai was defeated. The advance of the Champa army on Phan Rang was halted when Chu-Kiam Thang, the Nguyen commander threatened to execute Po Saktiraydaputih should the Champa army advanced any further. Fearing for the life of Po Saktiraydaputih, Oc-nha That and his army retreated. It is difficult to ascertain if Oc-nha That really cared for the safety of Po Saktiraydaputih who

had in fact collaborated with the Nguyen. It is equally difficult to be sure if the Cham forces under Oc-nha That was seeking the restoration of the Champa kingdom and sovereignty, or was merely a group aimed at plundering. Po Dharma in his analysis of the event interpreted Oc-nha That's effort as a manifestation of anti-Vietnamese sentiment among the Champa people.²⁰

In the early months of 1694, Po Saut passed away. The Nguyen Lord, Nguyen Phuc Chau, sent two hundred strings of money to ensure that the burial was carried out in a grand manner. A month later, Ngo Lang and Oc-nha That again laid siege to Phan Rang. Reinforcements for the defence of Phan Rang arrived from dinh Binh Khang, and Ngo Lang's forces were forced back into Khmer territory and the siege was lifted.

The establishment of the phu Binh Thuan in the former Pho Hai-Phan Rang-Phan Ri area followed by a series of war between the anti-Vietnamese Champa elements and the Vietnamese army, left the area in severe famine and the people hit by plagues.²¹ Apart from the difficulties caused by the military clashes, the new Vietnamese administration was ill-prepared to govern the Champa territories. The problem was partly resolved when Nguyen Phuc Chau renamed the area tran Thuan Thanh,²² and appointed Po Saktiraydaputih as the Ta Do Doc (a governor) to administer the region on behalf of the Nguyen Lords. Two months later, Po Saktiraydaputih was made the native king of tran Thuan Thanh, and was obliged to pay tribute to the Nguyen Lords. Thus, the tributary relationship thereupon resumed.

Even though the Champa people, now under the Nguyen-installed Po Saktiraydaputih, maintained a tributary relations with the Vietnamese Nguyen Lords, it is important at this point to determine the actual nature of the relationship, given the fact that the Kingdom of Champa no longer existed as an independent nation, but had been integrated as part of the Nguyen domains.

Since 1692, the Champa population continued to exist in small pockets from the region of Quang Nam down to the Pho Hai-Phan Rang-Phan Ri region where the seat of the Cham Court under Po Saktiraydaputih was situated. Although the Champa people continued to refer to their Kingdom at Pho Hai-Phan Rang-Phan Ri region as Panduranga, the fact remained that it was an occupied territory. The Champa court was in co-existence with a Vietnamese garrison, and that tran Thuan Thanh was, in the eyes of the Vietnamese, no more than another frontier station under the jurisdiction of phu Binh Khanh. In the eight month of 1697, the region west of the Phan Rang river was redesignated as the huyen (districts) of An Phuoc and this included the villages at Ham Thuan (Phan Thiet) and the area west of Phan Rang as well

as of Hoa Da which was east of Phan Ri. The Champa people were powerless to prevent such move.

The actual Vietnamese-Champa relations after 1697 under the Nguyen Lords was based on a central-regional relations where the rulers of Champa were reduced to no more than a governor of his own people. He became more of a cultural and economic leader than a political leader. But it was probably due to such relationship that the Champa people were able to co-exist with the Vietnamese people during the further southward expansion of the Nguyen Lords up to the late 18th Century.

Both the *Tien Bien and Phu Bien Tap Luc* [Miscellaneous Records of the Pacified Frontiers] gave lists of goods sent by Po Saktiraydaputih to Nguyen Phuc Chu as tribute in the eleventh month of 1694, and the seventh month of 1709 respectively.²³ The lists consisted of:

2 male elephants ²⁴	20 Yellow Oxen ²⁵	6 elephant tusks
10 Rhinoceros horn	500 pieces of White scarves	50 cattles of yellow wax
200 cattles of fish ski	200 trees of dark wood	One long boat ²⁶
400 pails of potash ²⁷	500 pieces of leaves for weaving conical hats	

Also included were some captured swords and saddles.²⁸

The accompanied letter from Po Saktiraydaputih begin with the submission tone of, "Chinh (Tran)-thon-ba-hu of Thuan Thanh tran, prostrate to present the annual gift of 1709"²⁹

It is unclear if any other tribute was sent between 1694 and 1709. In any case, irregularity in the sending of tribute was probably due to Po Saktiraydaputih's inability to raise a respectable tribute, given the fact that his people were recovering from the famine and diseases that had plagued the Champa territories in 1697. The other possibility was probably due to the Nguyen Lords' appreciation of the neutrality offered by Champa during the Nguyen's struggle against the Chenla (Khmer) kingdom during the period 1700 to 1709. Such neutrality was important for the Nguyen forces in conducting their military campaign against the Khmer people without having to worry about any form of harassment from Champa.

The favourable relationship between Po Saktiraydaputih and Nguyen Phuc Chau however, could not prevent friction from taking place in day-to-day affairs between the Champa people and the Vietnamese settlers newly brought into the Champa territories, and between the Champa people and the Vietnamese government administration of dinh Binh Khanh whose

jurisdiction covered the Champa territories at Pho Hai-Phan Rang-Phan Ri (Panduranga) region. Such friction involved the jurisdiction of law enforcement; the question of trade; question of trading taxes; slaves and labour contracts; and administrative boundaries, many Champa people were at the disadvantage positions when dealing with the Vietnamese in these matters.

An agreement was made in the ninth month of 1712 between Nguyen Phuc Chau and Po Saktiraydaputih under which, five provisions were agreed upon to regulate or govern the Vietnamese-Champa relationship in the dinh Binh Khanh. The Nguyen records mentioned that the agreement was made at the request of Po Saktiraydaputih, and that Nguyen Phuc Chau "granted" a list of rules (and not agreement).³⁰ It is difficult to ascertain if Po Saktiraydaputih had requested for such an agreement, but clearly, it was an important one, at least to safeguard the interests of the Champa people. Nevertheless, some of the articles were biased against their interests:

- 1) Anyone who petitioned at the Royal palace (of Po Saktiraydaputih) has to pay 20 string of cash (quan) to each of the Left-Right Tra (Vietnamese court official), and 10 string of cash to each of the Left-right Phan dung; Whereas those who petitioned at dinh Binh Khanh has to pay 10 string of cash to the Left-Right Tra, and 2 string of cash to each of the Left-Right Phan dung.
- 2) All disputes among Han people (Vietnamese); or between Vietnamese and a resident of Thuan Thanh shall be judged by the Phien Vuong (King of Champa) together with a Cai ba and a Ky Luc (Both Vietnamese officials); disputes among the people of Thuan Thanh shall be judged by the King of Champa.
- 3) The two stations of Kien-kien and O-cam shall be defended more carefully against spies. The authorities shall have no power to arrest residents of the two stations.
- 4) All traders who wished to enter the land of the registered barbarians must obtain a pass from the various relevant stations.
- 5) All the Champa people from Thuan Thanh who drifted to dinh Phien Tran must be well treated.

From the agreement, it is apparent that the Champa territories were well-penetrated by the Vietnamese settlers and that there was no distinct demarcation between a Champa and a Vietnamese area in the Binh Khanh dinh (Thuan Thanh area). Such entry of a foreign culture and large number of people inevitably forced the Champa people to accept the presence of the Viets while at the same time adopting some of the ways of life, including the

wearing of Vietnamese costumes, and the usage of the Vietnamese language in the community.

Nguyen-Champa relations between 1697 to 1728 was described by Vietnamese sources as amicable. In the seventh month of 1714 for instance, after the completion of the renovation in Thien Mu Temple in Phu Xuan in present day Hue, Po Saktiraydaputih brought his three sons to attend a celebration hosted by Nguyen Phuc Chau. The Nguyen Lord, who was a devoted Buddhist, was "very pleased" with their presences, that he appointed each of Po Saktiraydaputih's sons as Hau, or noble in-charge of a village.³¹

Three months later, Po Saktiraydaputih requested assistance from the Nguyen Lord for the establishment of an official court. The *Tien Bien* recorded how Nguyen Phuc Chau ordered a plan to be drawn up for the Champa ruler where the respective positions of the military and civil officials in the court were specified.³² Again, given the nature of the Nguyen chronicles, it is difficult to be sure if Po Saktiraydaputih had actually made such a request, or whether the whole Vietnamese court system was imposed upon Champa. Nevertheless, it represent another step towards the Vietnamization of Champa.

Under Po Saktiraydaputih, the people of Champa remained subservient to the Nguyen authority. Between 1700 and 1728, during a period where the Nguyen Lord expanded their power into Chenla, or the Khmer territories, the Champa people were provided with numerous opportunities to free themselves from the domination of the Vietnamese. This was because the Champa territories bordered the Khmer kingdom, and thus Champa could well have joined the Khmers against the Nguyen and disrupt the military movements of the Vietnamese who had to go through dinh Binh Thuan enroute to the front against the Khmers. Yet under Po Saktiraydaputih, no such action was undertaken. Military weakness on the part of Champa would probably be the main reason for failing to do so. Further more, the Vietnamese garrison at dinh Binh Thuan was the major military base against the Khmers, leaving Champa very little room to manoeuvre.

CONCLUSION

Nguyen-Champa relations underwent a shift after the death of Po Saktiraydaputih in 1728. In that year, Champa revolted against the Vietnamese, but were swiftly defeated. The inability of the Champa people to shake off the domination of the Nguyen left them with little choice but to remain under Vietnamese rule. This led to further Vietnamization process to the extent that subsequent Champa rulers took the Vietnamese family name of Nguyen.

After 1728, Nguyen-Champa relations was relegated to the status of prefecture affair. The Champa rulers conducted their affairs with the prefects of phu Binh Thuan and rarely had any direct contact with the Nguyen Lords capital at Phu Xuan. A survey of the inventories of the Cham Archives of Panduranga however, provided some lights and suggested that the post-1728 Nguyen-Champa relations was still governed by the regulations set between Nguyen Phuc Chu and Po Saktiraydaputih, and thus, was a continuity of the pre-1728 relationship.

Even though the Champa people later threw their lots with the Tayson uprising in 1771, a movement which brought an end the rule of the Nguyen Lords in 1775, they were still unable to break away from Vietnamese rule. When the Nguyen Dynasty (1802-1945) was started by Nguyen Phuc Anh, a direct descendant of the Nguyen Lords in 1802, Champa (Thuan Thanh) was listed as one of the 13 vassal states of the Nguyen. Champa continued to be an autonomous principality, at least in the cultural sense within the Nguyen Dynasty until 1835 when this special relationship was ended when the Champa people were crushed by another major Vietnamese after having joined the aborted Le Van Duyet rebellion against Emperor Minh Manh (1819-1840) of the Nguyen Dynasty.

NOTE

1. The initial domains of the Nguyen Lords only covered the two provinces of Thuan Hoa and Quang Nam, Nguyen Hoang, the first Nguyen Lord was given the governorship of Thuan Hoa in 1558, and had his jurisdiction extended in 1570 when he was also offered the governorship of Quang Nam. For a study of Nguyen Hoang, see Keith Taylor, "Nguyen Hoang and the beginning of Vietnam's Southward Expansion", Anthony Reid (ed.), *Southeast Asia in the Modern Era: Trade, Power and Belief*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 43-65; see also L. Cadiere, "Le Mur de Dong-Hoi: Etude sur L'etablissement des Nguyen en Cochinchine" [The Wall of Dong-Hoi: Study on the establishment of the Nguyen Lords in Cochinchina], *Bulletin D'Ecole Francaise D'Extreme-Orient* (hereafter *BEFEO*), Vol. VI, 1906.
2. Given the multi-ethnicity within the Champa Kingdom, the term Champa will be used intermittently throughout the essay, referring not only to the official name of the political entity, but also the population within the kingdom. Apart from the Chams, there were others who also lived within the Champa Kingdom, including hill tribes of Austronesians origins, who took active part in the political lives of the Champa Kingdom.
3. A *phu* is equivalent to a prefecture in traditional Vietnam.
4. *Dai Nam Thuc Luc Tien Bien* (hereafter *DNLTB*), Vol. 1, pp. 22b-23a.
5. *DNLTB*, Vol. 2, p. 14b.
6. A *dinh* is equivalent to a military base or garrison in Traditional Vietnam.
7. The usage of the term Tran Bien or boundaries station actually refers to all immediate southern frontiers, newly conquered during the early days of the expansion, and should not be confused with Tran Bien or present day Bien Hoa, which was wrested from the Khmer kingdom in 1697.
8. *DNLTB*, Vol. 2, p. 17b.
9. Namely, Nguyen Hoang (1558-1613), Nguyen Phuc Nguyen (1613-1635), and Nguyen Phuc Lan (1635-1648).
10. *DNLTB*, Vol. 3, pp. 15b-16a.
11. The name Ba Tam which is found in Vietnamese materials is the same person as Po Nraup in the Cham Archives from Panduranga. See Po Dharma, *Le Panduranga (Campa) 1802-1835, ses rapports avec le Vietnam*, Vol. I, Paris: Ecole Francaise D'Extreme-Orient, 1987, p. 64.
12. *DNLTB*, Vol. 4, p. 22.
13. The name Ba-tranh which is found in Vietnamese materials is the same person as Po Saut in the Cham Archives from Panduranga. See Po Dharma, *Le Panduranga*, p. 67.
14. *DNLTB*, Vol. 7, p. 4. It is interesting to note that ever since 1629, Cham military actions against the Vietnamese were seen upon as rebellion, even though Champa was then still an independent state of its own. Such interpretation has a lot to do with the Vietnamese world view of regarding the Chams and other nations and minorities tribes as tributary entities of the Vietnamese, thus the term "rebellion".
15. A *Huyen* is equivalent to a district in Vietnam.
16. *DNLTB*, Vol. 7, p. 5b.
17. Like the name of Po Saut, Po Saktiraydaputih was used in the Cham Chronicles of Panduranga, whereas Vietnamese sources used the name Ke-Ba-tu. See Po Dharma, *Le Panduranga*, p. 68.
18. *DNLTB*, Vol. 7, p. 5b-6a.
19. *Dai Nam Chinh Bien Liet Truyen, So Tap* or Biographical Records of the Emigrant People of Dai Nam, Vol. I (hereafter *DNCBLT*), Chapter 33, p. 22b. It is interesting to note that the return of royal regalia and population are not mentioned elsewhere in the Vietnamese material. Nevertheless, the presence of the 30 Vietnamese soldiers is evident. In a draft register of the orders of the

- King of Champa dated 1738, five ligatures of rice were loaned by the King of Thuan Thanh to pay the salaries of the Vietnamese soldiers. See *Inventaire des Archives du Panduranga: du fonds de la Societe Asiatique de Paris*, Paris: Centre d'Histoire et Civilisations de la Peninsule Indochine, 1984, p. 75.
20. Po Dharma, *Le Panduranga*, p. 68.
 21. *DNLTB*, Vol. 7, p. 9a.
 22. Another term for military base or garrison.
 23. *Phu Bien Tap Luc* (hereafter *PBTL*) or Miscellaneous Records of the Pacified Frontiers, written by Le Quy Don in 1776 provided a list of the tribute of 1709. The list bore similar items to that of the 1694 list except for an extra male elephant recorded for the 1709 tribute, see *PBTL*, Vol. 2, p. 30a. Li Tana in her 1993 translation of the excerpt, read the 60-year Chinese cycle of Ky Suu as 1769, see Li Tana, "Miscellaneous Nguyen Records Seized in 1775-6: Phu Bien Tap Luc by Le Quy Don", in *Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on the Economic History of Cochinchina [Dang Trong] 1602-1777*, Li Tana & Anthony Reid (eds.), Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies & Australian National University, 1993, pp. 100-101. However, the same Ky Suu also means year-1709 when Po Saktiraydaputih sent a tribute to the Nguyen Lord, see *DNLTB*, Vol. 8, p. 7a for a correct corroboration.
 24. *PBTL* mentioned three male elephants as part of the 1709 tribute, out of which, two were actually delivered at phu Binh Khang, and one was replaced by a payment of 150 quan tax-money. See *PBTL*, Vol. 2, p. 30a.
 25. *PBTL* also mention how in 1709 each of the oxen could be redeemed by paying 60 quan of cash, see *PBTL*, Vol. 2, p. 30a.
 26. *PBTL* give the length of the boat as 7 tam or about 22.4 metres, see *PBTL*, Vol. 2, p. 30a.
 27. *Cat Soi* in Vietnamese. Presumably to be used for making soap or fertilizers.
 28. *DNLTB*, Vol. 7, p. 9; no sword and saddle were mentioned as part of the 1709 tribute.
 29. *PBTL*, Vol. 2, p. 30a.
 30. *DNLTB*, Vol. 8, p. 14a.
 31. *DNLTB*, Vol. 8, p. 18b.
 32. *DNLTB*, Vol. 8, p. 20b.
 33. Phan Thuc Truc, *Quoc Su Di Bien* (A Transmitted Compilation of the Dynasty's History), Hong Kong: New Asia Research Institute Reprint, 1965, Vol. 1, p. 88.